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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3901 
___________ 
 
HOWARD RUBINSKY, 
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
AHMED ZAYAT,  
also known as EPHRAIM ZAYAT 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-01540) 
District Judge:  Honorable William J. Martini 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 18, 2016 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, KRAUSE and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 4, 2017) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Howard Rubinsky appeals pro se from the District Court’s orders entering 
summary judgment against him and denying reconsideration of that ruling.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm those orders. 
I. 
 In March 2014, Rubinsky commenced this action by filing a counseled complaint 
in the District Court against Ahmed Zayat.  The complaint, brought pursuant to the 
District Court’s diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), alleged claims for breach 
of contract and unjust enrichment.  Zayat ultimately moved for summary judgment on 
several grounds, one of which was that Rubinsky’s claims were time-barred under New 
Jersey’s governing six-year statute of limitations, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-1, because 
they accrued no later than 2005 and expired no later than 2011.  In opposing that motion, 
Rubinsky argued that the claims were timely because they did not actually accrue until 
April 2008 (just under six years before he filed his complaint).  On June 4, 2015, the 
District Court granted Zayat’s motion for summary judgment, rejecting Rubinsky’s 
argument and agreeing with Zayat that the claims were time-barred because they accrued 
no later than 2005.  Rubinsky then timely moved the District Court to reconsider that 
ruling.  On November 2, 2015, the District Court denied reconsideration.  Rubinsky, now 
proceeding pro se, appeals from those two District Court orders. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
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plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  See Lomando v. 
United States, 667 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 2011).  Summary judgment is appropriate when 
“the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  Although the non-
movant’s evidence “is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his 
favor in determining whether a genuine factual question exists,” summary judgment 
should be granted “unless there is sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably find for the 
nonmovant.”  Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  We review the District Court’s denial of 
reconsideration for abuse of discretion, exercising de novo review over the District 
Court’s legal conclusions and reviewing its factual findings for clear error.  Howard Hess 
Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 Rubinsky raises two arguments in support of his challenge to the two District 
Court orders at issue here.  First, he contends that the claims in his complaint were timely 
filed because the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-22 
and the doctrine of equitable tolling.  Second, he reiterates his argument that his claims 
are timely because they did not accrue until April 2008.  Neither of these arguments 
entitles him to relief here.  Rubinsky’s tolling argument has been waived because he did 
not present it to the District Court in the first instance.  See Tri-M Group, LLC v. Sharp, 
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638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 2011).1  As for Rubinsky’s accrual argument, for substantially 
the reasons provided by the District Court in its opinions accompanying its two orders, 
we agree with the District Court that his claims accrued no later than 2005.  Because the 
six-year limitations period expired well before Rubinsky filed his complaint in 2014, the 
District Court correctly concluded that his claims were time-barred and that Zayat was 
entitled to summary judgment.         
 In light of the above, we will affirm the District Court’s June 4, 2015 and 
November 2, 2015 orders.   
                                              
1 Even if Rubinsky had preserved his tolling argument, we would reject it on its merits.  
Section 2A:14-22 provides for tolling of the limitations period if (1) the defendant is not 
a resident of New Jersey when the claim accrues or he is not residing in New Jersey 
during the statutory period, and (2) “it appears . . . that, after diligent inquiry and effort, 
long-arm service cannot be effectuated.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-22a.  In those 
circumstances, the limitations period is tolled during the periods of non-residence.  See 
id.  Rubinsky avers that Zayat was periodically out of the United States between 2002 
and 2005, and that Zayat spent the summer of 2007 in California.  Assuming for the sake 
of argument that these averments warranted tolling the limitations period (1) through the 
end of 2005, and (2) during the summer of 2007, Rubinsky’s 2014 complaint would still 
be untimely by roughly two years.  As for Rubinsky’s equitable tolling argument, he has 
not demonstrated that any of the grounds for that relief are present in this case.  See 
F.H.U. v. A.C.U., 48 A.3d 1130, 1145 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (explaining that 
“[e]quitable tolling is traditionally reserved for limited occasions,” including when 
(1) “the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff,” (2) “the plaintiff has in some 
extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights,” or (3) “the plaintiff has 
timely asserted his rights mistakenly in the wrong forum”) (certain quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Kocian v. Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co., 707 F.2d 748, 753 (3d Cir. 1983)).    
